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INTRODUCTION 
Young Americans are starting their adult lives with chains around 
their necks.1 Increasingly, they feel penalized for getting an education.2 
I borrowed 42K, and I now owe double . . . I feel like this is NEVER 
going to end. I can’t afford to buy a house; I have excellent credit, 
_________________________________ 
1. Mario Parra Sr., Real Student Debt Stories, Student Debt Crisis: Real Student 
Debt Stories (Aug. 11, 2017), http://studentdebtcrisis.org/read-student-debt-stories/ 
(entries are listed chronologically descending from the most recent post).  
2. Shayne, Real Student Debt Stories, Student Debt Crisis: Real Student Debt 
Stories (Aug. 31, 2017), http://studentdebtcrisis.org/read-student-debt-stories/. 
1
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but my debt to income ratio is so disproportionate that I cannot get a 
loan.3 
I graduated in 2007 with a 3yr BFA degree and now owe 180,191+.  
This will never be paid off. It rises every day. I’m an American 
citizen that has been penalized for getting an education that should 
have bettered my situation. Not garnished my wages and my life.4 
To see the young starting their adult life with a chain around their 
necks. Never in our past history has that been the case. How is it 
possible that instead of making it easier we are making it more 
difficult for them to succeed?5 
These general feelings of hopelessness will be exacerbated by President 
Trump’s plan to end the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program 
(“PSLF”) in an effort to take even more away from the unfortunate 
indebted student.6 PSLF forgives the outstanding balance on a federal 
loan when the student has made 120 qualifying monthly payments 
under a repayment plan while working for an eligible employer.7 This 
program is one of few available to students with federal loans, enabling 
students to escape the indentured servitude of student loan repayment 
after making a significant and good faith effort at to repay.8 
Unfortunately, for the majority of students today, cheap or free 
higher education is an unattainable fairy-tale of the past.9 It is a pay to 
play system; unless a student has money or scholarships, he must obtain 
student loans if he desires a college and/or graduate level education. 
_________________________________ 
3. Ashley Biggs, Real Student Debt Stories, Student Debt Crisis: Real Student 
Debt Stories (Sept. 30, 2017), http://studentdebtcrisis.org/read-student-debt-stories/. 
4. Shayne, supra note 2.   
5. Parra Sr., supra note 1.   
6. See id.; see also Zack Friedman, Trump May End Public Service Student Loan 
Forgiveness, FORBES (May 18, 2017, 8:02 AM) [hereinafter Trump May End], 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2017/05/18/trump-public-service-
student-loan-forgiveness/#55eda6ee1eb8.  
7. Public Service Loan Forgiveness, Fed. Student Aid: An Off. of the U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/ public-
service (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).  
8. Id.  
9. Carolyn Maloney, The Student Debt Crisis Solution, Politico (Oct. 4, 2015) 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/10/the-answer-to-the-student-loan-
debt-crisis-213217.  
2
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Economists have expressed that this new education system is affecting 
the economy in a harmful manner.10 Americans are still paying off their 
student loans well into their 30s, 40s, and 50s, instead of buying homes, 
investing, or starting businesses.11 As of February 2017, the national 
student debt was the highest it had ever been—at a whopping $1.3 
trillion total—with 44.2 million borrowers, and an average borrower 
graduating with $37,172 in student loan debt.12 The debt reached $1.4 
trillion during that same year.13 With student loan debt accelerating and 
compounding at such a high rate, a repeat of the 2008 Mortgage Crisis 
may not be so distant. To avoid another economic disaster, the student 
loan debt crisis must be addressed before it is too late. 
Not only is the government considering the removal of PSLF and 
other beneficial programs for students, but currently, student loans are 
virtually non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.14 Bankruptcy used to be a 
viable option for unfortunate student loan debtors until Congress 
enacted 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), which made student loans virtually non-
dischargeable overnight.15 Although not entirely immune to 
bankruptcy, the amendment required student loan debtors to establish 
that repaying the loan would cause an “undue hardship” on the student 
to be absolved of liability.16 However, Congress left “undue hardship” 
open to interpretation by the courts. Now, almost thirty years after the 
enactment of § 523(a)(8), circuit splits have emerged with majority 
views, minority views, and super minority views concerning the “undue 
hardship” test. The bankruptcy code requires consistency, but a strict 
test making the discharge of these loans impossible will not suffice. 
_________________________________ 
10. Id.  
11. Id.  
12. Zach Friedman, Student Loan Debt in 2017: A $1.3 Trillion Crisis, Forbes 
(Feb. 21, 2017, 7:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2017/ 
02/21/student-loan-debt-statistics-2017/#651347ed5dab Student; Household Debt: 
Changes in Types of Borrowers and Debt, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/press/pressbriefings/household-borrowing-student-
loans-homeownership (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).  
13. Bill Fay, Students & Debt: More on Students, DEBT.ORG, 
https://www.debt.org/students/ (last visited May 17, 2018) [hereinafter Students & 
Debt]. 
14. Trump May End, supra note 6; see also infra Part III. 
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). 
16. See infra Part III, IV. 
3
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Fortunately, it is not too late for Congress to reconsider student loan 
discharge. The debt trend shows that the national student loan debt will 
only continue to increase and the midnight hour is approaching. 
This comment suggests that the answer to the student loan crisis is 
a combination of congressional reform and judicial persistence. 
Overturning 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) is the most effective way to hold 
student loan lenders accountable for their predatory and unethical 
practices, while at the same time preventing economic collapse in the 
future. Meanwhile, the judiciary must consistently adjudicate these 
ongoing student loan issues. This comment will not focus on an in-
depth economic analysis of the 2008 Mortgage Crisis and the current 
student loan situation. Instead, it will compare the similarities and 
differences between the 2008 disaster and the impending student loan 
crisis. Part II will illuminate the history and evolution of student loans 
and the rising cost of education.17 Part III will explain how Congress 
virtually abolished student loan dischargeability in bankruptcy and 
enabled lenders to lend predatorily and without risk.18 Part IV will then 
survey the statutes and case law surrounding the current and convoluted 
status of student loan dischargeability in bankruptcy.19 Part V will 
introduce the student loan crisis and compare the existing student loan 
situation with what happened in 2008.20 Finally, Part VI will propose 
congressional and judicial solutions to fixing not just the student loan 
problem, but the educational system as well.21 
II.  EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN 
This may be hard for some to fathom, but education used to be free. 
Not until the 1990s were student loans even necessary for higher 
education.22 Federal loans were first introduced in the late 1950s when 
America entered the “Space Race” with Russia and the rest of the 
_________________________________ 
17. See infra Part II. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part V. 
21. See infra Part VI. 
22. BILL ZIMMERMAN, THE STUDENT LOAN SWINDLE: WHY IT HAPPENED – 
WHO’S TO BLAME – HOW THE VICTIMS CAN BE SAVED 281–91 (2014) (ebook). 
4
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world.23  President Dwight Eisenhower’s focus on scientific expansion 
and research led to the enactment of the National Defense Education 
Act of 1958, which authorized direct loans to student borrowers,  
backed by the United States Treasury.24 These low interest loans made 
it easier for public universities to grow as they now had funding from 
both the government and students.25 However, only a small group of 
public and private universities received close to 80 percent of the 
funding allotted.26 Thus, Lyndon B. Johnson enacted the Higher 
Education Act of 1965 “to bring better education to millions of 
disadvantaged youth who need it most” and “to put the best educational 
equipment and ideas and innovations within the reach of all students.”27 
First, the federal government guaranteed student loans provided by 
private bankers and non-profit lenders, forming a program now entitled 
the Federal Family Education Loan Program (“FFELP”).28 Economists 
and politicians disagreed considerably over whether the loans should be 
direct or guaranteed.29 Interestingly, the 1965 budget rules required a 
loss when loans were made directly rather than when loans were 
guaranteed.30 Therefore, it was a win-win for Johnson’s budget—there 
was no immediate loss, and more students were able to attend college. 
However, economists were concerned that the government was making 
financial decisions without assessing the future risks and costs that 
_________________________________ 
23. Richard B. Keeton, Guaranteed to Work or It’s Free!: The Evolution of 
Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy and the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling in Hedlund v. 
Educational Resources Institute Inc., 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 69 (2015). 
24. Id. (citing National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 
Stat. 1580 (1958) (codified as amended in 20 U.S.C.)). 
25. Id.  
26. Id. at n.25 (explaining that this small group consisted of merely twenty 
universities). 
27. Id. (quoting Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: Toward 
Full Educational Opportunity, The Am. Presidency Project (Jan. 12, 1965), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27448). 
28. Education Policy: Student Loan History, NEW AM., https://www.new 
america.org/education-policy/policy-explainers/higher-ed-workforce/federal-
student-aid/federal-student-loans/federal-student-loan-history (last visited Mar. 22, 
2018).  
29. Id.  
30. Id.  
5
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come with potential defaults, administrative costs, and interest 
subsidies.31 
The economists’ prayers were answered in 1990 when President 
George H.W. Bush signed the Federal Credit Reform Act.32 This Act 
required that all loans include an estimated “subsidy cost;” the 
government would need to set aside money to cover the costs associated 
with each loan.33 This more logical approach to budgeting brought new 
policy to Capitol Hill and as soon as 1992, the government began 
leaning away from guaranteed backed loans and toward direct loans.34 
An analysis from the Bush administration indicated that direct loans 
would deliver loans at a significantly lower cost to taxpayers because 
private banks no longer served as middlemen, and the government was 
freed from paying private lender fees and cost subsidies.35 However, 
until 2010, roughly 73 percent of all student loan borrowers continued 
to choose lending through the guaranteed loans of FFELP, partly due to 
the aggressive marketing tactics used by the private banks.36 Congress 
then passed The Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2010, 
which eliminated FFELP and made all federally-backed loans under the 
direct loan program mandatory.37 Although FFELP loans were 
discontinued, private education loans were still authorized; the federal 
government simply refrained from guaranteeing them.38 
As student loans were evolving, college was becoming more 
expensive. Beginning in the late 1980s and 1990s, college tuition 
increased as many states developed large budget-deficits.39  With 
popular support for tax-reducing measures, state welfare and poverty 
programs were first put on the chopping block, followed by other public 
services.40 Soon after, state funding to public universities was 
dramatically reduced and the universities had no choice but to raise 
_________________________________ 
31. See id.  
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Keeton, supra note 23, at 73. 
37. See id.  
38. See id. 
39. Zimmerman, supra note 22, at 295.  
40. Id. 
6
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tuition.41 State cuts to education have further accelerated in the recent 
years. For example, California’s public university tuition increased 
more than 70 percent between 2007 and 2012.42 To keep their elite 
status and take advantage of the ever-growing need for a college degree, 
private institutions also increased their tuition.43 
Over the last twenty years, there has been a tectonic shift in how 
America views education.44 The burden to educate the public was 
initially on the state government, but now, the expense is transferred to 
the student because states and universities can get away with it.45 This 
was the perfect profit opportunity for Wall Street;46 loans were 
guaranteed, college was expensive, and the market for a college degree 
was flourishing.47 With the increasing cost of education, lenders 
recognized the huge profit potential.48 When students repaid loans—as 
opposed to the government—banks could retain their fees and 
interest.49 However, when students defaulted, the guarantees kicked in 
and the government would paid the remaining loan balance to the 
banks, as well as late fees and any accumulated penalties.50 It was a 
win-win for the lenders and there was seemingly no risk to student loan 
lending. 
III.  STUDENT LOANS AND BANKRUPTCY 
If risk-free lending was not enough for the banks, students took the 
largest blow when their only escape route was taken away: the right to 
discharge federally backed student loans in bankruptcy.51 This was the 
_________________________________ 
41. Id. at 300. 
42. Id. at 320–25 
43. Id. at 325. 
44. See id. at 310, 325. 
45. Id. 
46. See generally id. at 365–74. 
47. See id. at 365–80. 
48. Id. at 374. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. G. Michael Bedinger VI, Note, Time for a Fresh Look at the “Undue 
Hardship” Bankruptcy Standard for Student Debtors, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1817, 1821 
(2014) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012)).  
7
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first time the government wholly singled out a specific class of loan.52 
In 1998, Congress repealed and replaced 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) with 
statutory language that allowed students to discharge their loans only 
when repaying such loans would cause an “undue hardship.”53 The 
“undue hardship” test was not a novel concept relating to the 
dischargeability of student loans in 1998.54 The test was enacted in 
1976.55 In the late 1970s Congress was alarmed when it heard rumors 
of medical and legal professionals abusing the bankruptcy system and 
discharging massive debt before entering their practices.56 At that time, 
the U.S. Trustee Program (the organization now responsible for 
policing and enforcing the integrity of the bankruptcy code) did not 
exist.57 Congress decided to address the abuse of student loan 
dischargeability by requiring debtors to wait five years before they 
could discharge the loan or prove to the court that making payments 
toward the student loan was causing an “undue hardship.”58 This five 
year waiting requirement forced many doctors and other professionals 
with graduate student loan debt to attempt a “good faith” effort to pay 
their debts. Ironically, this push for regulation was based on practically 
no statistical evidence.59 
_________________________________ 
52. Zimmerman, supra note 22, at 398. 
53. See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. 105-244, § 971, 112 
Stat. 1581, 1837 (striking the other option for student debt relief following a specified 
time period) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012)).  
54. As of 1998, the “undue hardship” test was not a novel concept because 
Congress had previously inserted this language into legislation. See Education 
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-482, § 439, 90 Stat. 2081 (1976) (codified as 20 
U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976)) (repealed 1978).   
55. Id. (providing how a loan could only be discharged prior to a five-year 
waiting period if payment would “impose an undue hardship on the debtor or his 
dependents.”). 
56. See Frank T. Bayuk, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for Student Loans 
Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence for the Undue 
Hardship Exception, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2004).  
57. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, §§ 101 et seq., 586, 
92 Stat. 2549, 2549–54, 2663–64 (1978) (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 586 
(2012) and 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2012)); About the U.S. Trustee Program, U.S. 
Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/ust (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).  
58. Bayuk, supra note 56, at 1094–95.  
59. Id. (“Rather, it justified the proposal on the belief that even a small number 
of ‘abuses’ discredit the system and cause disrespect for the law and those charged 
8
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The difference between the 1976 legislation and the 1998 
legislation was that the 1976 legislation provided a student with two 
routes to discharge student loans in bankruptcy.60 Students could either 
wait five years from the time payment on the loan commenced, or they 
could qualify under the “undue hardship” analysis.61 Post 1998, only 
the “undue hardship” route existed and it was subject to court 
interpretation.62 The last nail was hammered into the student loan 
dischargeability coffin in 2005 when Congress amended the statutory 
definition of student loan to a “qualified educational loan,” aligning it 
with the  broad definition of the Internal Revenue Code § 221(d)(1).63 
With this new broad definition and assuming that a student could not 
pass the “undue hardship” standard, all student loans were now non-
dischargeable if they were “incurred by the taxpayer solely to pay 
qualified higher education expenses . . . .”64 Consequently, private 
lenders who did not participate in FFELP were also able to join the club 
when it came to non-risk lending. 
IV.  THE UNDUE HARDSHIP TESTS 
Section 523 of the United States Code references many types of 
debts that are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.65 The prominent policy 
behind bankruptcy is “to discharge certain debts to give an honest 
individual debtor a ‘fresh start.’”66 With the use of the words “certain 
_________________________________ 
with its administration.’”); COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT ON 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. I, at 11, 170, 176–77 (1973). 
60. See Bayuk, supra note 56, at 1095–96. 
61. See id.  
62. See id.  
63. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(8)(B) (2012)). 
64. I.R.C. § 221(d)(1) (Supp. 2000).  
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012).  
66. Chapter 7 Eligibility, U.S. Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/ 
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics (last visited May 17, 
2018) [hereinafter Chapter 7]; see also Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918) 
(“The federal system of bankruptcy is designed not only to distribute the property of 
the debtor, not by law exempted, fairly and equally among his creditors, but as a main 
purpose of the act, intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in 
life, free from debts, except of a certain character, after the property which he owned 
9
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debts,” it is clear that Congress intended that all debts not be created 
equally.67 “Congress created these exceptions to the general rule of 
dischargeability on the ground that ‘the creditors’’ interest in 
recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweighed the 
debtors’ interest in a fresh start.”68 Even though the amendment to § 
523(a)(8) is highly discouraging, Congress did not place student loans 
on the same non-dischargeable platform as other non-dischargeable 
debts.69 There is a back door for student loan dischargeability, which is 
the “undue hardship” test.70 Unfortunately for students, it is up to the 
courts to interpret the meaning of “undue hardship” and to this day the 
Supreme Court has refused to put it to rest.71 Currently, 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(8) states: 
(8)  unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph 
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents, for— 
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or 
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program 
funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit 
institution; or (ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an 
educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or 
_________________________________ 
at the time of bankruptcy has been administered for the benefit of creditors. Our 
decisions lay great stress upon this feature of the law—as one not only of private but 
of great public interest in that it secures to the unfortunate debtor, who surrenders his 
property for distribution, a new opportunity in life.”).  
67. See generally Chapter 7, supra note 64.  
68. Hiatt v. Ind. State Student Assistance Comm’n, 36 F.3d 21, 24 (7th Cir. 
1994) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)).  
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (Taxes, government fines and penalties, money 
obtained by fraud, and willful and malicious injury are just some of the completely 
non-dischargeable debts listed).  
70. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
71. See Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 794 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(where the Seventh Circuit held that the debtor’s student loans were not dischargeable 
because the debtor did not have an “undue hardship” under the Brunner Test), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 803 (2016).  
10
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(B)  any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as 
defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
incurred by a debtor who is an individual . . . .72 
Because the legislature left “undue hardship” undefined, many circuit 
courts began to define the meaning for themselves.73 
A.  The Johnson Test 
A notable approach to interpreting the meaning of undue hardship 
occurred in In re Johnson.74 There, the court established that for a 
debtor or bankrupt person to have an “undue hardship” they must pass 
the three-prong Johnson test: the “mechanical test,” the good faith test, 
and the policy test.75 The “mechanical test” asked whether the debtor’s 
foreseeable income would allow the debtor to pay the student loan while 
also paying any expenses associated with staying above the minimum 
poverty line including supporting any dependents.76 If answered in the 
negative, the court would proceed to the second prong, the good faith 
test.77 If answered in the affirmative, the court would deny the 
discharge.78 Once the debtor passed the “mechanical test,” the court 
would then apply the good faith test, asking whether the debtor was 
irresponsible or negligent in minimizing expenditures, securing 
employment, or maximizing resources.79 If no negligence or 
irresponsibility was found, the debtor was entitled to discharge.80 If the 
answer was yes—and such irresponsibility or negligence would have 
changed the answer of the “mechanical test”—a presumption to deny 
discharge was created; a negative answer to the policy test, however, 
_________________________________ 
72. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).  
73. See infra Part VI Sections A–C. 
74. See generally Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re 
Johnson), No. 77-2033, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 
27,1979). 
75. Id. at *59–60. 
76. Id. at *60. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
11
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could rebut this presumption.81 The policy test required that the debtor’s 
“circumstances,” meaning “the amount and percentage of total 
indebtedness of the student loan and the employment prospects of the 
petitioner, indicate” whether the primary reason for the bankruptcy was 
to discharge the student loan, or whether the debtor has benefited 
financially from obtaining the loan.82 In other words, the policy test 
determined whether the debtor had financially bettered himself because 
of the student loan or was simply trying to rid himself of the obligation 
to pay it back. If the answer was affirmative to either question, a 
discharge would be denied.83 If answered in the negative, a discharge 
would be granted.84 Because this test is confusing and complicated, 
other courts have rejected it and moved on to a more objective and 
simplistic approach.85 
B.  The Bryant Test 
Almost a decade after the Johnson court first set the standard for 
“undue hardship,” the same Pennsylvania court searched for a simpler 
approach to the issue in In re Bryant.86 Here, unlike the test in Johnson, 
the court objectively focused on the federal poverty line and whether 
the debtor’s income was above or below that threshold.87 If the debtor’s 
income was below the poverty line, a discharge would be appropriate. 
Again, this rationale was based on Congress’ intent to prevent abuse 
and inequitable situations from occurring; thus, the court alluded that 
low-income individuals are not abusing the system.88 If the debtor’s 
income was above the federal poverty line, a presumption of abuse 
would arise and the debtor would receive no discharge unless he or she 
could show “unique” or “extraordinary” circumstances.89 By 
_________________________________ 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at *60–61.  
83. Id. at *61.  
84. Id. 
85. See, e.g., Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 
B.R. 913, 915 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
86. Id. at 915, 915 n.2. 
87. Id. at 915. 
88. See id. at 917 (“It is quite apparent that such ‘abuses’ are not unchecked by 
allowing discharges to persons whose income is at or below the poverty guidelines.”). 
89. Id. at 917.   
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simplifying the Johnson test down to one step, the court’s idea was to 
provide a more objective approach to defining “undue hardship.”90  
Unfortunately, this test only survived six months before the Second 
Circuit adopted a new test.91 
C.  The Brunner Test 
The Second Circuit’s Brunner test, derived from In re Brunner, has 
been accepted in some fashion as the leading majority standard in the 
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.92 In 
Brunner, the debtor filed for bankruptcy after receiving her Master’s 
degree in social work.93 At the time of filing, the debtor was 
unemployed, on food stamps, and seeking treatment for anxiety.94 The 
debtor testified that her anxiety was partly due to her inability to gain 
employment in her field of study after sending out over one hundred 
resumes in pursuit of a job.95 Two months after filing her petition, the 
debtor filed an adversary proceeding seeking to discharge her student 
loans.96 The New York bankruptcy court found that employment in her 
field was limited and her current income would not allow her to repay 
her student loans without “undue hardship.”97 In reversing the 
bankruptcy court’s ruling, the district court explained that 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(8), “commits the student to repayment regardless of his or her 
subsequent economic circumstances.”98 In obtaining a discharge of 
student loans in bankruptcy prior to five years after they first came due, 
the court required a three-part showing: 
_________________________________ 
90. Id. at 915; see also Keeton, supra note 23, at 80. 
91. Keeton, supra note 23, at 80; see generally Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher 
Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 
92. B.J. Huey, Comment, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time 
Finally Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy 
Code?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 89, 111–12 (2002). 
93. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 46 B.R. 752, 753 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).  
94. Id. at 757. 
95. Id.  
96. Id. at 753. 
97. Id. at 757. 
98. Id. at 756. 
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1) that the debtor cannot, based on current income and expenses, 
maintain a “minimal” standard of living for himself or herself and 
his or her dependents if forced to repay the loans, 2) that this state of 
affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment 
period of the student loan, and 3) that the debtor has made good faith 
efforts to repay the loans.99 
On appeal to the district court, the bankruptcy court’s judgment was 
reversed and the court found that the debtor had not sufficiently 
established the second and third elements of the test.100 The court 
placed a focus on the debtor’s ability to pay her student loans in the 
future and noted that nothing in the record supported a finding that the 
debtor maintained an inability to pay or find work for any significant 
time.101 The court first noted that the debtor was capable of at least some 
type of work and had no dependents at the time of her bankruptcy 
filing.102 Although the debtor testified that she was consulting a 
therapist about her anxiety in relation to her unemployment, “there was 
no evidence in the record that her depression and anxiety impaired her 
capacity to work.”103 Secondly, the court alluded that the debtor had not 
adequately demonstrated to the court that her filing was in good faith.104 
The debtor filed for bankruptcy within one month of the date that her 
first student loan payment was due.105 Nor had the debtor even 
attempted to seek out bankruptcy alternatives, such as deferred 
payment.106 As such, the debtor did not meet the last two elements of 
the test and she was not entitled to discharge.107 
_________________________________ 
99. Id.  
100. Id. at 758. 
101. Id.   
102. Id.   
103. Id. at 757. 
104. See id. at 758; see also Hedlund v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., 718 F.3d 848, 854 
(9th Cir. 2013) (discussing how interpretation of the “good faith” requirement 
ultimately rests with the appellate courts under the clearly erroneous standard of 
review). 
105. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 758. 
106. Id.   
107. See id.   
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V.  THE STUDENT LOAN CRISIS 
Today and since the beginning of time, misconceptions have 
roamed the minds of individuals everywhere.  From the early days of 
Ptolemy and the “geocentric” theory that the earth was the center of the 
universe to the Renaissance and the belief that Christopher Columbus 
discovered America (Christopher Columbus did not discover North 
America first108), it is clear that misconceptions are still prevalent. 
Luckily, these misconceptions were innocuous because those beliefs 
were later corrected with new information. But what happens when a 
misconception is capable of producing dire consequences to the 
masses? The most recent example of this situation appeared in 2008, 
known as the 2008 Mortgage Crisis or Great Recession. The bursting 
of the mortgage bubble started with the misconception that housing 
prices would continue to increase indefinitely.109 From the 1940s to the 
2000s, housing prices had increased over 390 percent.110 This 
misconception did not solely affect buyers looking to get in on a “safe 
investment” either—subprime mortgage lenders alike were stern 
believers.111 Subprime mortgage lending dealt with originating loans to 
individuals who normally and traditionally have lower credit scores and 
who do not have the recommended amount of cash collateral available 
to enter into a traditional loan.112 For instance, individuals with a high 
debt to income ratio and poor credit were given mortgages that they 
normally would not be able to receive from other lenders in exchange 
for much higher interest rates.113 Another tradeoff for homeowners was 
_________________________________ 
108. Eric Weiner, Coming to America: Who Was First?, Nat’l Pub. Radio 
(Oct. 8, 2007, 2:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyId=15040888.  
109. Andrew Woodman, Note, The Student Loan Bubble: How the Mortgage 
Crisis Can Inform the Bankruptcy Courts, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 179, 181–82 (2013). 
110. Id. at 182 (explaining that during this time period, “[t]he median home 
value in the United States quadrupled from $30,600 to $119,600.”).  
111. See id. (citing Greg Ip, Housing Prices Always Rise, Wash. Post (Dec. 20, 
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/opinions/outlook/worst-
ideas/housing-bubble.html).  
112. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 67 (2011), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.  
113. Id.  
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that most of these subprime loans were structured as Adjustable Rate 
Mortgages (ARMs) that would initially start with lower payments, but 
in turn would increase significantly over the years forcing the 
homeowner to either refinance or be foreclosed upon when they could 
no longer afford the payments.114 The subprime lenders had nothing to 
lose because the loans were secured by real properties with values 
increasing annually.115 Even if the homeowners defaulted, the banks 
were protected by foreclosure. This misconception was discredited in 
2007 when there was a rapid decrease in housing prices, which caused 
widespread panic.116 In 2008, together with the subprime mortgage 
loans and the plunge in housing prices, one out of every twenty 
homeowners was in default, leaving foreclosure as the only viable 
option.117 
Wall Street was in a panic. Many mortgage-backed securities 
(“MBS’s”) instantly became “toxic” assets overnight.118 MBS’s 
consisted of a compilation of mortgages that were packaged up and sold 
to investors for trade on the open market.119 When the collateral (the 
homes) that secured the mortgages became under secured120 due to the 
price fall and with the combination of one in every twenty homeowners 
defaulting, MBS’s lost value immediately and investment firms 
imploded in what we know now as the 2008 Mortgage Crisis.121 
A similar student loan bubble has the potential to be an even larger 
problem and requires attention before America suffers the same crisis 
it suffered in 2008. Unlike the Mortgage Crisis, not one misconception 
is involved, but two.122 The first misconception is that obtaining a 
college degree will always be economically viable, and the second is 
that student loans are low-risk investments and non-dischargeable in 
_________________________________ 
114. Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 
IND. L.J. 213, 227 n.58 (2013). 
115. See Woodman, supra note 109, at 182. 
116. Jamie P. Hopkins & Katherine A. Pustizzi, A Blast From The Past: Are the 
Robo-Signing Issues that Plagued the Mortgage Crisis Set to Engulf the Student Loan 
Industry?, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 239, 241 (2014). 
117. See id. at 243–44. 
118. Id. at 241. 
119. Simkovic, supra note 114, at 214. 
120. Meaning the value of the home dropped to less than that of the mortgage. 
121. Id.  
122. See generally Woodman, supra note 109, at 183. 
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bankruptcy.123 Traditionally in America, a college degree increased 
earning potential when compared to individuals lacking a college 
degree.124 From 1976 to 1999, a college graduate’s salary was 1.8 times 
more than the salary of a high school graduate.125 The increase rose to 
50 percent more when a graduate degree was pursued.126 On average, 
these increases acted similarly across genders and race, and education 
was in fact, considered as a whole, a worthy investment.127 Compiling 
the value of a college degree with the availability of college through 
student loans, bachelor degree awards have exploded.128 From 1988 to 
2011, there was a 72 percent increase in bachelor degrees awarded and 
the numbers continue to rise.129 For instance, in the 2015–16 graduating 
year there were 2,894,987 graduates, which equated to a 170 percent 
increase from 2011 and a 290 percent increase from 1988.130 The 2015–
16 graduating statistics are slightly lower than those of the prior year, 
which counted graduates at 2,915,251, but I would not declare a plateau 
just yet.131 These statistics only account for students who complete their 
education in an undergraduate degree program.132 However, they do not 
account for the students who enter college or graduate degree programs, 
nor for students who leave or drop out with student loan debt.133 
Naturally, with more students entering and completing college, 
there is a rising national student debt. This can be seen when looking at 
1999’s cumulative student loan debt of just $92 billion and comparing 
it to today’s student loan debt of about $1.4 trillion, which is a near 
1000 percent increase.134 How can the number of graduating students 
rise only 290 percent, while outstanding student loan debt rises to 1500 
_________________________________ 
123. Id.  
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. See supra Part II. 
129. See Woodman, supra note 109, at 184. 
130. See Christian Tizon, Undergraduate Degree Earners Report, 2015-16, 
Nat’l Student Clearinghouse Res. Ctr., fig.1 (2017), https://nscresearchcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/UndergradDegreeEarnersRpt-2015-16.pdf. 
131. Id.  
132. See id.  
133. Id.  
134. See Woodman, supra note 109, at 188; Students & Debt, supra note 13. 
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percent? What is causing this grossly disproportionate ratio of 
graduating students to student loan debt? Inflation is certainly one 
factor (as graduating students are individuals who do not adjust for 
inflation), but the true cause is the government—enabling bankers, 
investors, and students into activities believed to have no 
consequences.135 For the student, it is the promise that education is the 
best investment and that students are guaranteed to repay their loans 
later, but for investors and banks, it is that student loans are entirely low 
risk assets that can be traded.136 
Advocates of change in the student loan industry focus on many of 
the similarities between the circumstances leading up to the housing 
crisis and what is currently happening with student loans. The first 
similarity, briefly touched on above, is the eccentric idea that everyone 
can own a home and that everyone should have a college education.137 
Ken Lin, the CEO of creditkarma.com, stated, “A college education is 
a path to life success just like home ownership is a path to financial 
stability. In reality, some people aren’t suited for it.”138 The ideas that 
both objectives are necessities and everyone should participate in 
obtaining an education contributes to the bubble. 
The second similarity is that interest rates played a large role in both 
the 2008 mortgage collapse and the current student loan situation.139 
People can no longer pay their debts once interest rates spiral the debt 
out of control. Although the interest rates appear to be low and 
attractive, the ARM loans of the mortgage industry quickly became 
unaffordable, just as a $30,000 student loan will turn into $50,000 
within a matter of years.140 But the most notable similarity is how both 
industries focused on getting anyone and everyone approved for a loan. 
In the mortgage industry, this was achieved through subprime mortgage 
lenders, while in the student loan industry, it is even easier because the 
government allows students to obtain government backed loans without 
_________________________________ 
135. See supra Part II. 
136. See generally Woodman, supra note 109, at 185; see supra Part II.  
137. Sheryl Nance Nash, 5 Ways the Student Loan Bubble Mirrors the Housing 
Crisis, THE FISCAL TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/ 
Articles/2012/10/25/5-Ways-the-Student-Loan-Bubble-Mirrors-the-Housing-Crisis.  
138. Id.  
139. Id.  
140. Id.  
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even a credit check.141 This first started through FFELP and now occurs 
under the direct loan avenues.142 
The policy decision to authorize loans without assessing the risk to 
repay them has had a detrimental impact on the quality of our 
educational system. Issues such as Trump University are popping up, 
where private for-profit education institutions are taking advantage of 
the student’s ability to obtain loans and using high-pressure sales tactics 
on individuals who are just beginning their professional lives.143 In 
return, students are left with nothing to show for their expensive 
investment.144 And Trump University is not the only perpetrator; for-
profits have begun a takeover in the student loan industry through 
savvier and more effective marketing tactics.145 For instance, from 2000 
to 2014, the total student loan debt of students enrolled at for-profit 
institutions grew from $39 billion to $229 billion.146 Although 
alarming, investors and politicians do not seem to fear the 
consequences. 
A primary reason bankers, investors, and politicians are able to 
sleep at night might revolve around the overall size of the student loan 
debt in comparison to the mortgage industry. Although student loan 
debt has been consistently and considerably increasing over past 
decades, $1.4 trillion remains a dwarf in comparison to the current 
$8.94 trillion in mortgages.147 While opponents to change suspect a 
crash would still hurt the economy—and specifically, the industry of 
higher education—they distinguish it from the mortgage crash.148 But 
_________________________________ 
141. Id.  
142. See supra Part II. 
143. See Michael Barbaro & Steve Eder, Former Trump University Workers 
Call the School a ‘Lie’ and a ‘Scheme’ in Testimony, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/us/politics/donald-trump-university.html. 
144. Id.  
145. Gillian B. White, The Empty Promises of For-Profit Colleges, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/ 
the-failure-of-for-profit-colleges/405301/. 
146. Id.  
147. See Students & Debt, supra note 13; Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Quarterly 
Report on Household Debt and Credit pmbl. (2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2018Q1.pdf.  
148. See, e.g., Marc Prosser, 5 Reasons the Student Loan Crisis is Nothing like 
the Mortgage Crisis, Forbes (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/marcprosser/2012/08/22/student-loan-crisis/#2054a6896c1c.  
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distinguishing the crises does not equate to disregarding the issue of 
student loans altogether. Even opponents believe that the student loan 
industry is causing an economic strain as the availability of student 
loans enable more loans, triggering college tuition to rise, thus 
increasing student loan balances.149 “If the level of student debt 
continues to grow at its current rate, it could become a significant 
economic drag, as the younger generations delay purchases that would 
have otherwise fed economic growth.”150 
Like MBS’s, student loan asset backed securities (“SLABS”) have 
now become heavily traded.151 MBS’s are similar to SLABS because 
they both start with a single student loan that is packaged with other 
student loans and then traded on the free market.152 However, the 
difference between SLABS and MBS’s is critical. For one, SLABS are 
completely unsecured.153 The only thing securing SLABS is 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8) non-dischargeable bankruptcy law.154 Mortgages, on the 
other hand, are at least secured by a piece of property.155 When the 
housing market collapsed, there was something to pursue even if the 
value of the home had decreased significantly. The owner did not incur 
a complete loss of the security. Conversely, if the SLABS market 
crashes, there is nothing to go after and no home to foreclose on. While 
creditors do have access to the courts for a creditor judgment, this 
remedy still poses a risk—these debtors just finished college and may 
have no assets at all, leaving nothing for creditors to collect. 
V.  PROPOSALS 
Just as the Mortgage Crisis myth led to the 2008 crash, the myth 
that student loans are non-dischargeable will contribute to the 
_________________________________ 
149. See id.; see also supra Part II.  
150. Prosser, supra note 148.  
151. See Woodman, supra note 109, at 199. 
152. Id.  
153. Id. at 218.  
154. Id. (citing Julie Swedback & Kelly Prettner, Discharge or No Discharge? 
An Overview of Eighth Circuit Jurisprudence in Student Loan Discharge Cases, 36 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1679, 1681–83 n.16 (2010)). 
155. See Woodman, supra note 109, at 183.  
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industry’s demise. In 2011, Jason Iuliano156 conducted a study of 
student loan adversary proceedings in bankruptcy and reviewed how 
many of those proceedings were successful in discharging student 
loans.157 The results were alarming. In 2007, 169,774 student loan 
debtors filed for bankruptcy.158 Of those 169,774, only 217 adversary 
proceedings were filed seeking a student loan discharge.159 Of those 
217 proceedings, 51 received a full discharge, 30 received a partial 
discharge, 25 received an administrative remedy, and 111 received no 
remedy at all.160 Why are only 0.00128 percent of student loan debtors 
filing adversary proceedings when roughly 50 percent of all 
proceedings filed receive some form of remedy? The study further 
found no statistical difference in outcome between being represented 
by an attorney and appearing pro se.161 Iuliano’s study focused 
primarily on three possible theories. First, lenders may be settling 
outside of bankruptcy.162 This theory is unlikely, because bankruptcy 
courts can discharge federal student debt, which makes up the bulk of 
total student loan debt as a whole.163 Second, debtors may be turning to 
administrative remedies such as the Income Contingent Repayment 
Plan164 or PSLF. Third, and the most likely theory, is student debtors in 
bankruptcy believe in the myth that student loans are either non-
dischargeable or nearly impossible to discharge.165 Since 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(8) was enacted, the myth has circulated that student loan debtors 
are having an extremely difficult time meeting the “undue hardship” 
test.166 “One article in The New York Times went so far as to contend 
_________________________________ 
156. Jason Iuliano obtained the following credentials: J.D. Harvard Law School; 
Ph.D. Student in Politics, Princeton University. Jason Iuliano, An Empirical 
Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 495, 495 n.* (2012). 
157. See generally id. at 499–501 
158. Id. at 505. 
159. Id.  
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 523. 
162. See id. at 506. 
163. See id. (explaining how “less than fifteen percent of borrowers have private 
student loans . . . .”). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
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that ‘[t]he cases are so harsh in measuring what an undue hardship is 
that anybody who is working and maintaining any kind of home life has 
very little chance of discharging these things in bankruptcy.’”167 
A.  Congressional Proposals 
If another Mortgage Crisis is to be prevented, action must be taken 
sooner, rather than later. In the House of Representatives, the Discharge 
of Student Loans in Bankruptcy Act of 2017 was introduced by House 
Member John Delaney on May 4, 2017.168 The bill has not yet been 
passed and remains in the first stage of the legislative process.169 “This 
bill amends the federal bankruptcy code to permit a borrower to 
discharge in bankruptcy a nonprofit, government, or private student 
loan, or an obligation to repay an educational benefit, scholarship, or 
stipend.”170 
The only way to prevent another economic disaster is by going back 
to our roots and making student loans dischargeable again. In pre-1998 
bankruptcy laws, college degrees were offered based on supply and 
demand.171 Colleges needed to research the job market and adjust 
curricula accordingly. Universities had “skin in the game.” It is only 
logical that if students do not find jobs after school and begin paying 
their loans, the loans will default, the bank will suffer losses, and 
ultimately, the bank will not lend or at least be hesitant to lend to that 
college or university in the future. 
Loans were based on an analysis of risk versus benefit. This system 
forced colleges to perform a risk analysis on the degrees offered and 
_________________________________ 
167. Id. at 506–07; (quoting Jonathan D. Glater, That Student Loan, So Hard to 
Shake, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2008) https://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/08/24/business/24loans.html).  
168. Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 2366, 115th 
Cong. § 1 (2017) [hereinafter DSLBA]. 
169. Id.; see also H.R. 2366 Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy Act of 
2017, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr2366 (last visited 
May 18, 2018). 
170. Summary H.R. 2366—115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2366 (May 18, 2018); see 
generally DSLBA, supra note 168. 
171. Pauly, Supply and Demand of College Degrees: 101, CHI.NOW: The C. 
Scoop (July 25, 2016, 2:18 PM), http://www.chicagonow.com/college-
scoop/2016/07/supply-and-demand-of-college-degrees-101/.  
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compete heavily. For-profit private schools like Trump University, that 
took advantage of easy money, were almost entirely non-existent or 
failed because they were unable to produce wage earning students. 
Although FFELP—the current direct student loan system—and private 
loans are based on good intentions, they have morphed into a weed that 
is slowly killing the economy. By making student loans dischargeable, 
banks and lenders will lose the secured status of their asset, be forced 
to perform better risk assessments, and ultimately, lend less. Fewer 
loans will result in more balanced tuition costs, because universities and 
colleges will not be able to increase tuition without loan funds available. 
In other words, colleges and universities will not be able to charge 
students more for tuition simply because they can get away with it. 
Colleges and universities will not be able to offer “basket weaving” 
degrees that serve little to no value to a student upon graduating. 
Congress has tried already to fix this issue.172 Most recently, 
Illinois Senator Richard Durbin introduced the Fairness for Struggling 
Students Act of 2013.173 While similar to the recent Discharge Student 
Loans in Bankruptcy Act of 2017, this bill was different because it 
focused solely on discharging private student loans.174 Although this 
bill died in Congress, it appears that Democratic senators still feel that 
student loans are an impending disaster and wish to fix it by introducing 
a bill that covers not just private, but all student loans.175 
Opponents of this idea and of House bills alike, might argue that 
introducing these bills will cause immediate damage to the economy. If 
student loans become dischargeable, a very large portion of the $1.4 
trillion debt may be discharged overnight leaving investors and banks 
at a major loss. Ultimately, these losses would make their way to the 
taxpayer because the majority of all student loans are now federally 
direct176 and if there is a default, the government pays the price.  When 
the government pays, the taxpayers are directly impacted. The last thing 
America needs is a bailout of defaulting students. 
_________________________________ 
172. See generally Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2013, S. 114, 113th 
Cong. §§ 1–2 (2013). 
173. Id. 
174. See id.  
175. See DSLBA, supra note 168. 
176. See supra Part II. 
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What many policy makers and investors do not understand is that 
for a full discharge to take effect under this new law, the debtor must 
still pass muster under the normal “means test” requirement to qualify 
for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy.177 The “means test” analyzes the debtor’s 
financial situation for the past sixty months to the date of filing.178 A 
large part of this calculation is based on the debtor’s income.179 If the 
debtor’s income is over a certain threshold (which is adjusted for 
dependents), the debtor will not qualify for Chapter 7 and be forced to 
pursue Chapter 13 Bankruptcy.180 Chapter 13 Bankruptcy forces the 
debtor to pay a percentage of their overall unsecured debt over a period 
of thirty-six to sixty months using their current disposable income.181 
At the end of this time-frame, the debtor’s remaining unsecured debt is 
discharged.182 A Chapter 13 Bankruptcy may also be useful to debtors 
seeking a discharge for their student loans considering Chapter 13 plans 
would pay at least something back to the lenders.183 Therefore, lenders 
would not suffer a complete loss, but would be able to receive sixty 
months of payments. However, this would defeat the purpose of the 
original loan contract by enabling student debtors to trade what may 
have been a fifteen to twenty-year loan repayment agreement to one of 
five-years in duration. Alternatively, it would be wise for lenders to 
push for ten-year Chapter 13 plans rather than five in student loan 
circumstances. 
If the Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy Act was passed, 
investors and politicians should not worry about the economy 
collapsing immediately because many student debtors would not 
qualify for bankruptcy. Currently, any single debtor making above the 
income threshold (which can range from $39,231 to $64,901 annually 
depending on the state of residence) would not qualify for Chapter 7 
_________________________________ 
177. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2012); see generally Means Testing, U.S. Dep’t 
of Just., https://www.justice.gov/ust/means-testing (last updated Apr. 16, 2018).  
178. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) (2012). 
179. See id. 
180. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2012). 
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2012). 
182. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (a) (2012). 
183. See id. 
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Bankruptcy.184 Only those below the income threshold would remain 
eligible. But, for student debtors whose income is below the “means 
test” threshold, it is a clear indication that the student loan education 
system may have failed them, as with their investment. The current 
“means test” law, paired with the good faith repayment requirement of 
the pre-1998 bankruptcy laws would serve as a safeguard to prevent 
students from abusing bankruptcy by using the law as an avenue to 
discharge their loans when they have the means to pay them. 
B.  Judicial Proposals 
The courtroom is another avenue where change is needed. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has not yet granted certiorari for 
any case concerning the “undue hardship” test.185 This has created an 
ambiguous definition of “undue hardship.” Depending on where a 
student debtor resides, the Court’s interpretation of “undue hardship” 
will determine whether or not the debtor qualifies for discharge in 
bankruptcy. This nation needs consistency, considering that the national 
student loan debt is spiraling out of control at an exponential rate. The 
rumor is that judges are reconsidering the Brunner test and seeking 
more adversary proceedings concerning the “undue hardship” 
analysis.186 Only 0.00128 percent of student debtors with student loan 
debt actually filed adversary proceedings.187 That number is simply too 
low for individuals who are seeking a fresh start. 
CONCLUSION 
America’s view and treatment of education is at the root of the 
education loan bubble. Americans must demand more than “basket 
weaving” degrees that provide no future and fail to promote the 
_________________________________ 
184. Means Testing: Census Bureau, IRS Data and Administrative Expenses 
Multipliers, U.S. Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/ust/means-testing/20171101 
(last updated Mar. 14, 2018).  
185. Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.,136 S. Ct. 803 (2016) (The United 
States Supreme Court denied petition for certiorari).  
186. Tara Siegel Bernard, Judges Rebuke Limits on Wiping Out Student Loan 
Debt, N.Y. Times (July 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/18/your-
money/student-loans/judges-rebuke-limits-on-wiping-out-student-loan-debt.html.  
187. See supra Part VI. 
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American dream of home ownership. The catalyst for change must start 
with Congress and the Judiciary, because student loan lenders are 
secured through bankruptcy law. The myth that student loans are non-
dischargeable has become a misconception to the majority. This 
ideology must change if we wish to avoid another economic crash and 
desire to better the education of Americans. The weed must be cut 
before it kills the tree. The last time our country faced a potential crash 
of such magnitude, it did not just watch, but encouraged one of the 
greatest mortgage collapses ever recorded. 
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